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Everyone will agree that the education of children is a matter of great
importance in which almost everyone has a vested interest. Not only
do children need education in order to become adults who can lead a
flourishing life, societies also need well-educated citizens, and parents
(normally) want to give their children such an education with which they
believe the children will lead a flourishing life. This general formulation
is, however, also the end of the agreement between everyone. The moment
people are asked which kind of education they believe is conducive to
which kind of flourishing life and who should have a say in formulating
these two questions, opinions start to divert. Also, most people (except for
instance libertarians or anarchists) will agree that the state has a responsi-
bility to look after the well-being of a country/nation and its citizens, but
the extent of this responsibility is again matter of dispute. In both cases
we can ask whether it is still possible to develop a position with regard to
education and the role of the state which has sufficient plausibility that will
be acceptable to most people, even given the differences in opinion. This is
the task that Levinson sets for herself in her book The Demands of Liberal
Education. Her aim is to develop “a carefully conceived, coherent liberal
political theory of children’s education” (p. 3). In this article I will address
three of the topics Levinson discusses in her book. The first is the aim of
liberal education, i.e. autonomy, the second is the position of the parents
and the state with regard to the education of children, and the third topic,
which I will discuss most extensively, is the ideal of detached schools as
the most conducive to the development of autonomy as well as whether
imposing such schools are in children’s interests.
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AUTONOMY
The basis of Levinson’s political theory of children’s education is a
weak perfectionist conception of liberalism and its accompanying minimal
substantive conception of autonomy, which she regards as the only defen-
sible interpretation of liberalism. Firstly, Levinson argues that a liberal
theory needs all three commitments found in diverse liberal theories, i.e.
the fact of pluralism; a legitimation process which is public or trans-
parent, to which all (potential) citizens participate equally and freely and
which is agreeable to all; substantive liberal institutions, i.e. a broad range
of specified individual liberties and accompanying governmental duties.
Secondly, Levinson wishes to develop a conception of autonomy which
is minimal enough to be acceptable to most people (though it will not be
acceptable to all) but not too minimal that it cannot secure the substantive
liberal institutions. Stanley Benn’s (1988) conception of autarchy, which
means that a person is self-directing though not necessarily on the basis of
a nomos which she has made her own by critical examination, for instance,
would be too minimal, because on such a basis the state does not neces-
sarily have a corresponding duty to provide education for all or ensure
the freedom of speech. Additionally it must be sufficiently substantive
to be able to make a distinction between autonomous and heteronomous
persons, but also give a place to deep commitments of people because an
autonomous person is not an atomistic unit.
The ideal of personal autonomy is then defined as “A substantive notion
of higher-order preference formation within a context of cultural coher-
ence, plural constitutive personal values and beliefs, openness to others’
evaluations of oneself and a sufficiently developed moral, spiritual or
aesthetic, intellectual, and emotional personality” (p. 35). I agree with
Levinson’s presumption that this conception of autonomy as an ideal meets
her aim to develop a theory that is defensible for most people in Western
liberal societies. I also agree that within a pluralistic society where the
information sources are overwhelming and easily accessible it is important
that people are able to judge which of the values, ideas and beliefs on
offer they do or do not want to adopt for their own lives, that they can
decide for themselves what they value in life and on the basis of which
conviction they do so. This does not mean that every option should be
open or can (psychologically) be considered by an autonomous person.
For instance, I would never consider buying a turquoise or yellow leather
couch, nor would I spend time reflecting over the possibility of having my
eyebrow or belly button pierced. These might seem trivial, but similarly, it
is completely impossible for me to seriously consider the option of voting
for a right-wing party. Does that mean that I am not a truly autonomous
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person? I do not think so, but I am not certain if Levinson would agree. I
believe that Frankfurt is right in arguing, “Unless a person makes choices
within restrictions from which he cannot escape by merely choosing to do
so, the notion of self-direction, of autonomy, cannot find a grip” (Frankfurt,
1999, p. 110). Thus, the plurality of values that an autonomous person
might need to have must also be restricted and guided by ideals or ulti-
mate values about which the person cares so much that she cannot betray
them (idem, p. 114). These values cannot, therefore, be brought into the
evaluation of one’s values on an equal basis. On the contrary, these are the
foundations of one’s evaluation and make a person who she is. Though
the person might not suffer “a wholesale loss of identity” as Levinson
calls it (p. 58) when she would question these ultimate values, changing
them or loosing them would imply a profound change of her identity. This
is neither something that can be prevented unless a person would avoid
deep commitments, nor something that is to be regretted, even though it
can be undermining. A profound example of this is J.S. Mill’s crisis in
which he asked himself the question: “Suppose that all your objects in life
were realized; that all the changes in institutions and opinions which you
are looking forward to, could be completely effected at this very instant:
would this be a great joy and happiness to you?” And an irrepressible self-
consciousness distinctly answered, ‘No!’ At this my heart sank within me:
the whole foundation on which my life was constructed fell down. All my
happiness was to have been found in the continual pursuit of this end. The
end had ceased to charm, and how could there ever again be any interest in
the means? I seemed to have nothing left to live for” (1969, p. 81).
The most important question, however, is not whether Levinson or I
believe that second order reflection on one’s beliefs, ideas and values and
those of others is in the interest of people, but whether or not it is of
such interest that children should be enforced to receive an education that
makes such possible. In other words, could we argue that the develop-
ment of autonomy is a fundamental interest or a right of children with
which a duty to assist this development corresponds? Levinson answers
this affirmatively. However, it is only the state that has the corresponding
duty to assist children to develop autonomy – though she also intimates
that children have a duty to receive such education. Her political theory
of children’s education does not encompass a specific content of the way
in which parents raise their children, nor does she seem to wish to legally
forbid practices that are not autonomy conducive. The paternalistic role
and authority of the state and the parents complement each other and
prevents that either has total control. Where the state “is responsible for
ensuring that children are given the means to develop their capacities for
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autonomy”, “parents . . . are responsible for their children’s physical and
psychological well-being, development of identity, and sense of cultural
coherence” (p. 57). But what are the implications of this for the position of
parents?
PARENTAL DUTIES AND RIGHTS REGARDING THE
EDUCATION OF CHILDREN
Levinson argues that a liberal state should impose liberal schooling on
children in order to ensure that children have the possibility of becoming
autonomous persons. Instead of giving children the option of opting out of
autonomy enhancing education, which would seem a liberal position, the
state should paternalistically decide that all children must undergo such
education. Levinson comes to this conclusion as follows. She begins by
arguing that children need paternalistic actions of other people and there-
fore the question is not whether or not one should act paternalistically
against children, but who best serves the interests of children. She then
argues that since the ability to choose is necessary in order to agree or
give consent, which is one of the primary sources of legitimacy in liberal
theory, a paternalistic authority that promotes such is superior. Addition-
ally, children have an interest in deciding which values they want to
endorse when they are adults and therefore the state has a right to overrule
parents and children’s wishes to be educated otherwise. “It is simply trying
to right the balance of power by giving individuals the ability in their adult
lives to do what they could not do as children – specifically, to determine
their own values and to adopt a conception of the good with which they
identify” (p. 48).
In addressing the balance of paternalistic power over children Levinson
follows Dwyer who argues that parents do not have a right over their
children, but a privilege. According to Hohfeld, whose theory Dwyer uses,
a privilege is the opposite of a duty. It is, he claims, a logical contradiction
for a person to have a duty as well as a privilege to do x. This means,
firstly, that when one has a privilege to do x, one does not have a duty not
to do x. For instance, when I have a privilege to enter the garden of my
neighbour, I do not have the duty to stay out of it. Secondly, when one has
a duty to do x, one cannot at the same time have a privilege to abstain from
performing the duty. In my view the term ‘privilege’ in the Hohfeldian
sense is inappropriate for the claim or position of parents, because of its
contradictory position in relation to ‘duty’. In my opinion, the basic term
we must use for the position of parents with respect to (the education of)
their children is ‘duty’, which is correlated to the fundamental interests
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or rights of children. However, being able to fulfil a positive duty, that is a
duty to do something, requires that one is given the freedom or liberty to do
so. This also applies to parents’ duty to educate their children. But which
term does justice to the assumption that parents primarily have a duty
towards their children and a freedom against others so that they can fulfil
their duty according to their conviction what is in the best interest of the
child? One of the best suggestions I have found is Eekelaar’s proposal that
parents have a duty-right to educate their children (1973, p. 220).1 Their
duty-right can be interpreted both in terms of a positive and a negative
right. Parents have a positive right against the state to assist them to be
able to educate their children and a negative right that others forbear from
intervening. Because their rights are dependent on their duties, the rights
are not absolute but conditional and can thus be overruled on the basis of
their insufficient or damaging exercise of their duty.
I would therefore also argue that though the state has a positive and
negative duty against parents, i.e. to assist them and to refrain from inter-
vening, it is a duty based on the rights of children against whom the parents
have a duty. Therefore, the state primarily has a duty against children. But
what does this duty comprise and how substantive should the educational
duty of the state be?
THE MEANS, ARE DETACHED SCHOOLS NECESSARY FOR
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUTONOMY?
I will first describe Levinson’s conception of and argument for detached
schools and then argue why this ideal is not the only one that can conduce
children’s development into autonomous adults. Secondly, I will propose
that the state’s duty should not be one of autonomy imposing education,
but autonomy enhancing education.
Levinson’s ideal liberal school is detached from the parents’ and home-
community’s values, beliefs and commitments in which children from a
variety of backgrounds are educated, which privileges critical inquiry over
indoctrination, value beliefs and commitments, fosters an atmosphere of
reflection detached from commitments of the other arenas of the child’s
life, would provide a group of evaluators and in which “the various aspects
and competencies of autonomy can be freely practiced and improved”
1 Eekelaar argues that parents have a duty-right to secure their children’s education
in terms of schooling. This duty right gives parents a claim (or positive right) to the
government to provide sufficient schools. My proposal is to expand this to other aspects of
parental education as well.
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(p. 61). In other words, the ideal liberal school fosters the development
of children’s autonomy by being a plural community which values critical
inquiry, toleration and reflectiveness.
There are two main questions against this conception of schooling or
schools: (a) are these schools necessary for the development of autonomy;
(b) is the ideal viable? Both questions need to be answered affirmatively if
one wishes to defend the state’s imposition of liberal schools for all. For,
if it would not be necessary that children attend detached liberal schools to
develop themselves into autonomous adults, the justification for the state
policy is questionable. That is, if non-detached schools are in principle
equally able to foster autonomy in children and if this school would be
chosen by the parents on the basis of a cultural or religious compatibility
with their own values, then the state cannot enforce detached schools on
the basis of the interests of the child in terms of the aim of autonomy.
Are Detached Liberal Schools Necessary?
The first question is whether schools must necessarily be detached from the
partial values, beliefs and commitments of children’s families and local
communities in order to be conducive to the development of autonomy.
At first, Levinson’s answer seems to be a non-negotionable yes. But in
the last chapter, she seems to change her strict opinion and argues that
religiously affiliated schools can be compatible with the liberal educational
ideal. Interestingly, she had already indicated such when she evaluated
the empirical studies into Catholic Schools in the United States (though
to challenge the necessity of parents sharing the values and aims of the
schools and forming a community, not to defend the possibility of liberal
Catholic schools) by arguing that the shared values of Catholic schools
are fully compatible with the aims of the detached liberal school (p. 81).
Thus, detached schools are not necessary per se for the development of
autonomy. Liberal religious schools, for instance, can also foster autonomy
(for instance Thiessen, 1993; De Ruyter, 1999).
The necessity of detached schools can also be questioned from another
perspective: do schools really matter in the development of children’s
autonomy? Levinson herself seems to deny this. In arguing that state-
directed education does not create uniform adults, she rightfully maintains
that schools are only one influence in the life of a child and that though
children might receive the same education, they do not learn the same.
On the contrary, she argues, “given the recent explosion of sources of
information to which children have access, it is hardly tenable to claim
that schools provide the only, or even the most influential, education that
children receive” (p. 73) and that the home seems to be more influential
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than the school too (though this is in relation to achievement). If this is
true, Levinson herself undermines her case for imposition of autonomy
imposing education. For, if she challenges the import of such education
for the development of children she cannot at the same time argue that it
is necessary that children receive such education which could therefore be
made obligatory.
Are Ideal Liberal Schools Viable?
The detached liberal school Levinson describes is an ideal school in
two senses. Firstly, there are as yet no real examples of the detached
liberal school and secondly, the description has a utopian character, i.e.
consists of excellent qualities only. The danger with ideals is, that one
can be so convinced about their excellent or perfect nature that one loses
one’s critical stance against one’s own ideals. For instance, on p. 62 she
argues “While many liberal parents may in general favor their children’s
thinking for themselves, interest in family harmony or the need to make
an important decision might (properly) trump the child’s opportunity to
practice autonomous decision-making. Thus a space separate from that
constituted by the child’s family and home community is needed in which
to pursue these norms without compromise”. It is of course an illusion
that a school does not or should not do the same at times. Similarly, I
cannot understand why a liberal school is better shielded against capitalist-
dominated education, because it is shielded from the direct influence
of parents and the local community. It is definitely not the government
whom we should bet our money on when it comes to a shield against
capitalist-dominated education, as the strategic plan of Estelle Morris
(former minister of Education for England and Wales) shows, by arguing:
“There is now wide acceptance that to build an economy that will continue
our success in the global market place we will need an even better educated
and more highly skilled workforce” (p. 1), or “better educated and more
highly skilled people are more likely to be in work, earn more and
contribute more productively to our economy and society. Knowledge and
skills provide individuals with their surest route into work and prosperity,
helping eradicate the causes of poverty and division in society” (p. 7).
In evaluating the ideal liberal school in comparison with other initia-
tives that seemed to be beneficial for the interests of all children, for
instance school choice programmes, Levinson has of course an advantage
that her ideal can be evaluated on theoretical grounds only, whereas the
alternative ideals are also discussed on the basis of empirical findings. The
experiment programme ‘school choice’ is for instance compared to the
extent to which it has been realised in practice. This cannot be done for her
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liberal ideal schools as yet. Whether or not ideal liberal schools can be real-
ised and then live up to the ideals is as questionable as the other ideals that
have been put into practice. Therefore, the fact that ideal liberal schools
fare better is not proven as yet, because the theoretical underpinnings of
the other ideals were as theoretically sound as Levinson’s.
CONCLUSIONS
Levinson has not been able to convince me that detached schools are neces-
sary for the development of autonomy in children and therefore should be
exclusively offered to children in liberal democracies. This does not mean
that detached schools are not a defensible type of school. I think it is a
school that will be welcomed by a lot of parents. I also think that most
of the characteristics of the ideal liberal school Levinson enumerates, for
instance learning to express themselves in terms others will understand,
be imaginative, learn to think critically, gain the skills and knowledge to
put their beliefs and values into practice (p. 60) should characterise every
school.
Maybe my problem is related to the ambiguity of the meaning of
‘detachment’. For instance, as already mentioned, in the last chapter
Levinson argues that it is in principle possible that liberal schools diversify
along religious lines. However, I do not think it is conceptually sound to
characterise a religious school as one that is detached from the (values of
the) children’s families and home communities. Of course there might be
children in a religious school whose parents do not adhere to the specific
religion themselves if the school has an open entry policy (as I think it
should have), but in general one will find that there is a coherence between
the religious basis of the school and that of the family. I think her argument
that in Great Britain, for instance (up till recently) “religion played a fairly
insignificant role in the lives of most British families, and that it exerts
little influence over the life of the country as a whole” (p. 158) shows that
it is not detachment or non-detachment that is in the end decisive if a school
can be a liberal school or not, but that it is the curriculum, the didactics and
the disposition of the teachers and management of the school that make it
such. One can think of liberal mono-cultural or religious schools, which
are open to children whose parents believe it is important that they receive
a particular religious induction, or of liberal multi-faith schools, where
children from various religious backgrounds work together, but have their
R.E. lectures separately as well as together.
It seems that it is not detachment per se that is important, but detach-
ment from a fundamental (which must probably be understood as unques-
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tionable) and socially divisive conception of the good life. Divisive can be
interpreted in two ways. In the first option, divisive means that the school is
built upon a particular conception of the good and makes a division against
the group of children it will take into the school. This does not mean
that the conception of the good is itself divisive in society neither does
it mean that such a school cannot assist children to become autonomous
persons. In the second option, ‘divisive’ means that the conception of the
good leads to a divisive society. That would be the case if adherents of
a conception of the good were discriminating or behaving aggressively
towards non-believers. Schools which are based on such conceptions of
the good cannot be allowed in liberal democracies, because they violate the
basic rules and rights of such a society. Levinson says that she is unable
to be precise about ‘fundamental’ or ‘socially’ divisive, because such is
dependent on a particular social and political context. The example of
the United States is an interesting one, because the examples of Christian
movements are precisely the evangelical and fundamentalist movements
that are fundamental and divisive. However, arguing against state funding
for fundamentalist schools does not mean that all religious schools should
be banned, even within the context of the United States.
Finally, a detached school is according to Levinson not detached from
societal or civic culture. I agree that a civic identity is important. However,
the idea of a detached school being attached to a civic culture confirms my
idea that autonomy enhancing schools are not necessarily detached from
the values etc of the children’s parents and communities. For, it is unclear
what such a civic culture is in concreto when it cannot be that of a lot of
the local controllers or parents. I do not think that there exists something
like a public culture, called civic identity, which though common to all
is detached from most local cultures. Again, I believe that what is more
important is that schools are not attached to anti or non-civic cultures
disabling children to become citizens of a liberal democracy by excluding
them from society or refraining from teaching basic liberal democratic
values and dispositions. Similarly, it is important that schools do not under-
mine children’s potential to become autonomous persons by indoctrinating
them. Such schools should not be condoned by the state. But neither should
the state endanger the child’s possibilities of developing autonomy and
liberal civic duties by estranging parents from the public school system (or
private schools which are state regulated).
Enforcing autonomy imposing schools on all children, without the
possibility of accommodating particular groups within a school will in
the end be more detrimental for them than enhancing the interest of
children. For instance, in the reconstruction of the events that lead up to
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the Mozert case, Galston (2002) gives an interesting illustration, on the
basis of Stephen Bates’ recount, how dysfunctional polarisation can be. It
appears that the parents and the principal of the middle school had reached
an agreement with respect to the objection of the parents with texts that
their children had to read for English. “The children could go to the library
during reading period, where they would read from an alternative textbook
on their own, without parental involvement or supervision” (the parents
had proposed to supervise their own children at first) (p. 120). The agree-
ment collapsed, because other schools in Hawkins County did not accept
this arrangement and suspended children from school. The parents then
felt forced to go to court. Though I could not argue that the agreement
was ideal and though there are profound pedagogical questions as well, I
believe that the interests of the children and those of a liberal democracy
would have been better served if this agreement had stood up. For, though
the parents objected to the reading, their children were in a plural public
educational environment. I would argue that the children’s interests are
better served in such an environment, even if it is not optimal, than in a
fundamentalist private school.
Additionally, if the description of fundamentalism “[. . .], as a tendency,
a habit of mind, found within religious communities and paradigmatically
embodied in certain representative individuals and movements, which
manifests itself as a strategy, or set of strategies, by which beleaguered
believers attempt to preserve their distinctive identity as a people or group”
(Marty and Appleby, 1991, p. 835) bears some truth, estranging funda-
mentalist parents and children from the public educational sector will
only fuel fundamentalist tendencies instead of reducing them. If children
are educated within an, admittedly, reduced plural environment in which
they are respected, Levinson’s liberal school is not realised in its ideal
form. However, if children can be kept in autonomy friendly or autonomy
enhancing schools, the state will serve the interest of more children than
if it would only provide and condone autonomy imposing schools. Addi-
tionally, if more children stay in these schools, more have opportunities to
practice the dispositions characteristic for a liberal democratic citizen (see
Levinson, pp. 63, 115), which serves the interest of a liberal democracy.
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